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State Constitutional Protection for 
Defendants in Criminal Prosecutions* 
Paul Marcus** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A great debate has been raging in recent years concerning the appli-
cation of state constitutional law in state criminal prosecutions. For 
many years, state constitutional provisions were essentially ignored with 
the entire emphasis placed on federal applications of the United States 
Constitution. In the last twenty years, however, many state judges have 
looked to their own state constitutions to determine if sufficient pro-
tections have been given to criminal defendants in state prosecutions. 
In this article, I shall look at this important development, focus on the 
debate about the propriety of the expanding scope of state constitutional 
law, and also review the relatively modest contribution which has been 
made by the Arizona courts. 
II. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
The first eight amendments to the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, 
provide substantial protection to individuals in criminal prosecutions. 
Found within these amendments are protections relating to searches, 1 
the privilege against self-incrimination,2 the right to a speedy trial,3 the 
right to counsel,4 the ability to confront witnesses,5 and the right to 
avoid cruel and unusual punishment. 6 Early in our jurisprudential 
history, however, the United States Supreme Court made clear that 
these protections were to be applied only to the federal government 
and not to the states. 
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1. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
6. U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII. 
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In Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,? the Court 
refused to extend these protections beyond the precise language of the 
amendments, which apparently limited their application to the federal 
government. It was only with the passage of the fourteenth amendment, 
particularly the due process clause, that a basis was created so as to 
apply these protections to the states. Even then, it took almost a full 
century until many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights were applied 
to the states in criminal cases. The fourteenth amendment was passed 
in 1868, but cases such as Gideon,8 Miranda,9 and Mapp10 were not 
decided until the 1960s. Thus, for most of the history of this country, 
the principal constitutional protection for individual defendants in 
criminal cases was not found under federal constitutional law. Instead, 
it was state law-both constitutional and statutory-that generally 
governed criminal cases. The states, however, generally construed pro-
tections for criminal defendants narrowly. Although a broader appli-
cation of state constitutional law in criminal cases may now be among 
"the most significant current development[s] in our constitutional 
jurisprudence," 11 it is of very recent vintage indeed. Justice Mosk of the 
California Supreme Court has effectively argued that an approach 
requiring state courts to look to state constitutions in criminal cases is 
not only appropriate, but historically based. He made the point clearly: 
Don't let anyone tell you state constitutions are redundant, even 
when their texts are similar to the federal Constitution. State charters 
do not get their inspiration from the U.S. Constitution. It was the 
converse: The Framers of the federal charter adopted almost all of 
the Bill of Rights from the charters of the original states.12 
Many distinguished judges, both federal and state, have called upon 
state judges to look first to their state constitutions to determine whether 
7. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). See generally Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Consti-
tutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1141, 1144 (1985). 
8. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (giving a right to counsel under the sixth 
amendment for defendants, at trial, in serious felony cases). 
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring warnings, under the fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination, for interrogation which results in statements given in response 
to custodial interrogation). 
10. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the fourth amendment search and seizure 
provision, along with the fourteenth amendment due process clause, to exclude evidence in state 
criminal prosecutions). 
11. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 707 (1983). 
12. Mosk, Beyond the Constitution, 7 CAL. LAw. 100 (1987). Judge Wright of the District 
of Columbia Circuit cheered "state judges who have resumed their historic role as the primary 
defenders of civil liberties and equal rights." Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions of 
a Federal Judge, 11 HAsTINGS CONST. L. Q. 165, 188 {1984). 
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violations have occurred in criminal cases. Justice Brennan of the United 
States Supreme Court has written: 
State courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the 
full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, 
are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending 
beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretations of 
federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to 
the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective 
force of state law-for without it, the full realization of our liberties 
cannot be guaranteed.13 
Since the beginning of our country, state constitutional provlSlons 
have always existed as independent grounds upon which to decide cases. 
States have always been free to grant more protection to individual 
defendants than that given by the federal constitution. The United 
States Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that "a state is free as a 
matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity 
than those this Court holds to be ne.cessary upon federal constitutional 
standards." 14 
This freedom has existed for almost two hundred years; the broader 
application of state constitutional law in criminal cases is, however, of 
very recent vintage. Two principal explanations have been offered. The 
first, and less cynical of the two, is that with so much activity by the 
federal courts in the two decades beginning in the early sixties, little 
13. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 
489, 491 (1977). The point was echoed by Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court: 
It once again is becoming familiar learning that the federal Bill of Rights was drawn 
from the earlier state declarations of rights adopted at the time of independence, 
that most protection of people's rights against their own states entered the federal 
Constitution only in the Reconstruction amendments of the 1860's, and that it took 
another hundred years and much disputed reasoning to equate most of the first 
eight amendments with due process under the fourteenth. 
Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165, 174 (1984). 
Because the state protections existed prior to the Bill of Rights, Judge Newman refers to the 
current trend as "old federalism" in response to the labeling of this development as "new 
federalism." See Newman, The "Old Federalism": Protection of Individual Rights by State 
Constitutions in an Era of Federal Court Passivity, 15 CoNN. L. REv. 21 (1982). 
14. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (emphasis in original). See also Pruneyard 
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) ("[We do not] limit the authority of the State 
to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual 
liberties more expansive than those conferred by the [f]ederal Constitution."). See generally 
O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) ("The states may, as the United States 
Supreme Court has often recognized, afford their citizens greater protection than the safeguards 
guaranteed in the Federal Constitution. Indeed, the states are 'independently responsible for 
safeguarding the rights of their citizens.' "); Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1153. 
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room was left for state creativity in the criminal justice area. 15 And, 
of course, very little activity occurred prior to the early sixties in either 
federal or state courts in terms of applying constitutional protections 
to defendants in criminal cases. 16 The other explanation is simply that 
the states were, until recently, generally not interested in providing 
constitutional protections and remedies for defendants in criminal cases. 
Justice Linde has argued that most state courts did not take seriously 
individual rights and liberties set out in state constitutions: 
State courts issued and still issue gag orders against the press without 
much concern whether their constitutions guarantee freedom to 
speak, write, or publish on any subject whatever. State courts did 
not probe very deeply into what a state's promise of equal privileges 
and immunities might mean for blacks or for women. Issues such 
as prayer in the public schools or trials without counsel and the use 
of illegally seized evidence did not rank high among the state courts' 
prioritiesY 
Problems arose even when state courts appeared to be relying, at 
least in part, on state constitutional guarantees. That is, if a state court 
resolved a criminal case looking to both federal and state constitutional 
provisions, the Supreme Court on review could not easily determine 
whether to resolve the matter on a substantive basis. If the case truly 
involved federal law, of course, the Supreme Court felt obliged to 
consider it. On the other hand, if the state decision gave the defendant 
more protection under the state constitution than provided by the federal 
constitution, the matter was not reviewable. Ultimately, the United 
States Supreme Court in Michigan v. Long18 made clear that it will not 
review cases where there are independent and adequate state grounds 
offered. The Court urged state judges, however, to clarify whether the 
state court opinion was one which rests "primarily on federal law [or 
is] interwoven with the federal law." 19 
15. Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1147. Justice Abrahamson noted that in the 1960s "it was 
almost as if state constitution law had disappeared." 
16. Of course, there were numerous exceptions for the truly egregious cases in which general 
due process violations occurred. The most obvious examples are found in the confession cases 
where the conduct of the police was viewed as sufficiently shocking so as to render the confessions 
unlawful. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (suspects tied and beaten prior to 
confessing); Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S 413 (1967) (defendant kept in small room with no bed 
or other furnishings and minimal food prior to confessing); Lynumm v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 
(1963) (the defendant spoke in response to threats that her children would be taken away from 
her). 
17. Linde, supra note 13, at 174. 
18. 463 u.s. 1032 (1983). 
19. Id. at 1040. Justice Brennan in an earlier law review article explained: 
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Some state courts have vigorously followed the language of the United 
States Supreme Court in many criminal justice situations by vigorously 
applying state constitutional provisions in criminal prosecutions. The 
most telling example is undoubtedly the South Dakota Supreme Court,s 
decision in State v. Opperman.20 The first time the state court dealt 
with the issue of warrantless inventory searches of automobiles, it found 
that the police procedure was unreasonable under the fourth amend-
ment. The United States Supreme Court disagreed.21 The state supreme 
court then granted a rehearing and determined that the inventory search 
specifically violated the individual,s rights under the South Dakota 
constitution, with the court noting that it was 
under no compulsion to follow the United States Supreme Court in 
that regard. . . . There can be no doubt that this court has the 
power to provide an individual with greater protection under the 
state constitution than does the United States Supreme Court under 
the federal constitution. This court is the !mal authority on inter-
pretation and enforcement of the South Dakota Constitution. We 
have always assumed the independent nature of our state constitu-
tion regardless of any similarity between the language of that 
document and the federal constitution.22 
The message has now become clear-state courts have an obligation 
to view their state constitutional provisions independent of the federal 
provisions. Moreover, they may be obliged to conduct that inquiry 
prior to any review of federal law. State judges throughout the United 
States are voicing this view strongly. A few comments are illustrative. 
Justice Quinn of the Colorado Supreme Court wrote: "We are not 
bound by the United States Supreme Court,s interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment when determining the scope of state constitutional 
protections. , 23 
Justice Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court said: "[t]he 
federal constitution establishes minimum rather than maximum guar-
And of course state courts that rest their decisions wholly or even partly on state 
law need not apply federal principles of standing and justiciability that deny litigants 
access to the courts. Moreover, the state decisions not only cannot be overturned 
by, they indeed are not even reviewable by, the Supreme Court of the United States. 
We are utterly without jurisdiction to review such state decisions. 
Brennan, supra note 13, at 501. 
20. 228 N.W.2d 152 (S.D. 1975). 
21. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
22. 247 N.W.2d 673, 674 (S.D. 1976). The language of the South Dakota constitution was, 
in the state court's words, "almost identical to that found in the Fourth Anlendment." Id. 
23. People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 140 (Colo. 1983). 
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antees of individual rights, and the state courts independently determine, 
according to their own law (generally their own state constitutions), the 
nature of the protection of the individual against state government. " 24 
Justice Stein of the New Jersey Supreme Court said: "[b]ecause a state 
constitution may afford enhanced protection for individual liberties, we 
'should not uncritically adopt federal constitutional interpretations for 
the New Jersey Constitution merely for the sake of consistency.' " 25 
To be sure, quite a number of judges now look back to the language 
of Justice Brandeis, which they view as applicable to judicial decision 
making, although it was originally intended to deal with legislative activi-
ties; "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and 
try novel. social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of 
the country. " 26 
III. THE NATIONAL APPLICATION 
In a host of non-criminal cases, we have seen much activity by state 
supreme courts in recent years in which state constitutional law prin-
ciples have been applied to provide greater protection to individuals 
than the federal law. The cases range from activism in enforcing church-
state separation27 to protecting interests of the mentally ill.28 The most 
widely heralded case, however, comes very recently from the Oregon 
Supreme Court dealing with obscenity. The court in State v. Henry29 
received an appeal from a defendant who had been convicted, under a 
state obscenity statute, of disseminating obscene material. The court 
discussed at length whether the materials would be found unlawfully 
obscene in a federal prosecution; it particularly looked to the United 
States Supreme Court's definition of obscenity as found in the numerous 
24. Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1153. 
25. State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 99, 519 A.2d 820, 823 (1987) (citing State v. Hunt, 
91 N.J. 338, 355, 450 A.2d 952, 969 (1982)). 
26. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
discussed in Pollock, supra note 11, at 717. The debate over the proper role and application of 
state constitutional law has been intense from the very beginning of this period of "new federalism" 
(or "old federalism" if you prefer). See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 
127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976), where the majority and the dissenters vigorously debated the proper 
application of state law vis-a-vis federal law. See infra text accompanying notes 81-104. 
27. See Note, Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing Separation of Church and State 
Through State Constitutional Provisions, 7l VA. L. REv. 625, 634 (1985). 
28. See Meisel, The Rights of the Mentally Ill Under State Constitutions, 45 LAw & CoNTEMP. 
PROBS. 7, 39-40 (1982). 
29. 302 Or. 510, 732 P.2d 9 (1987). 
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cases handed down over the last 30 years.30 The real question for the 
Oregon court, however, was not the United States Supreme Court's 
definition of obscenity, but whether the state statute violated the free 
speech clause of the Oregon constitution.31 Oregon's free speech clause 
is somewhat broader than the federal first amendment: "No law shall 
be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the 
right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every 
person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right. " 32 
For the Oregon court, the chief analysis related to its own interpre-
tation of the Oregon constitution, apart from any first amendment 
analysis which had previously been given by the United States Supreme 
Court. The court made clear that it would only "discuss the federal 
constitution and federal cases when of assistance in the analysis of the 
Oregon Constitution. " 33 Upon reviewing the language of the state 
constitution, as well as Oregon history, the court took a very broad 
view of the freedom of speech protected in Oregon. The court found 
that even if the expression had been viewed as obscene under the United 
States Supreme Court test, such a characterization would not 
deprive it of protection under the Oregon constitution .... We 
emphasize that the prime reason that "obscene" expression cannot 
be restricted is that it is speech that does not fall within any 
historical exception to the plain wording of the Oregon Constitution 
that "no law shall be passed restraining the expression of [speech] 
freely on any subject whatsoever."34 
Recognizing the narrow protection offered by the United States Supreme 
Court, the Oregon court nevertheless took a much- different view, relying 
exclusively on the Oregon constitution: "In this state any person can 
write, print, read, say, show or sell anything to a consenting adult even 
though that expression may be generally or universally considered 
'obscene.' " 35 
Although much broad movement has occurred in numerous areas of 
substantive law, the most dramatic developments have been in the 
criminal justice field. A variety of reasons has been offered for this, 
but the most attractive explanation relates to United States Supreme 
Court developments over the past twenty-five years. In the 1960s, when 
30. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
31. OR. CONST. art I, § 8. 
32. Jd. 
33. 302 Or. at 515, 732 P.2d at 11. 
34. Jd. at 525, 732 P.2d at 17. 
35. Jd. at 525, 732 P.2d at 18. 
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the Supreme Court was expanding the protections offered to individual 
defendants under the United States Constitution, 36 the state courts 
engaged in little activity independent of the federal constitution. As 
Justice Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has noted, "the 
state courts said little in the 1960s . . . it was almost as if state 
constitutions had disappeared. " 37 When the composition of the Court 
changed and the Warren Court became the Burger Court, rulings in 
the constitutional criminal procedure area also changed. Limitations 
were imposed on Miranda, 38 and the exclusionary rule as originally 
enunciated in Mapp,39 and a narrow reading was given to Gideon v. 
Wainwright. 40 
Many state judges, who had grown up professionally with the dictates 
of the Warren Court, recoiled against the Burger Court's narrow reading 
of these precedents. As Justice Brennan pointed out, "there has been 
an unmistakable trend in the Court to read the guarantees of individual 
liberty restrictively, which means that the content of the rights applied 
to the states is likewise diminished. " 41 Justice Brennan has argued that 
more and more state courts are writing to support the defense view of 
broader state constitutional protection. "And state courts have taken 
seriously their obligation as coequal guardians of civil rights and liber-
ties."42 For Justice Brennan, the development is a very positive one and 
36. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing the warnings requirement 
under the fifth amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule 
under the fourth amendment to the states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (broaden-
ing the scope of the sixth amendment right to counsel). 
37. Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1147. 
38. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements in violation of Miranda 
can be used at trial for impeachment purposes if the defendant takes the stand and makes a 
statement inconsistent with the earlier one); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (Miranda 
does not apply to statements where the questioning by the police officers was for purposes of 
protecting public safety rather than to obtain incriminating comments); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 
U.S. 492 (1977) (Miranda does not apply where the defendant was questioned at a police station 
but was free to leave). 
39. The two main cases limiting Mapp are Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (the Supreme 
Court rejected precise criteria for the determination of the validity of an affidavit in support of 
a search warrant and instead directed magistrates to make "common sense" determinations), and 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (the Court would not exclude evidence obtained as a 
result of a search in which the police officers relied, in reasonable good faith, on a warrant that 
later turned out to be invalid). 
40. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (the Court held that 
Gideon would not apply to cases in which the defendant did not receive a term of imprisonment 
as a penalty); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (the Court refused to extend the right to 
counsel to cases involving discretionary appeals). 
41. Brennan, The Bill of Rights in the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians 
of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 547 (1986). 
42. Id. at 548. 
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directly traceable to the line of cases where the Court stepped back 
from the broader holdings of the Warren Court in the criminal justice 
field.43 
A. The Search and Seizure Issue 
Whatever the particular observation or explanation which may be in 
vogue at the moment, the reality of the rapid development of state 
constitutional law in the criminal law area cannot be disputed. In some 
of the earlier cases, the state courts were hesitant to strike out on their 
own under the state constitutions; even when they did they tended to 
"rely heavily on general federal doctrines. " 44 More recently, however, 
state judges have been highly critical of federal doctrine as unduly 
limiting individual rights and protections in the criminal justice field. 
The trend can be discerned from a review of cases geographically as 
well as by subject. There are far too many cases which can be considered 
here to make the point clearly.45 They range from opinions exploring 
fairly narrow questions arising under the search and seizure provisions 
of state and federal constitutions, 46 to much broader search 
43. Of late, however, more and more state courts are construing state constitutional 
counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their 
states even more protection than the federal provisions, even those identically phrased. 
This is surely an important and highly significant development for our constitutional 
jurisprudence and for our concept of federalism. I suppose it was only natural that 
when during the 1960's our rights and liberties were in the process of becoming 
increasingly federalized, state courts saw no reason to consider what protections, if 
any, were secured by state constitutions. It is not easy to pinpoint why state courts 
are now beginning to emphasize the protections of their states' own bills of rights. 
It may not be wide of the mark, however, to suppose that these state courts discern, 
and disagree with, a trend in recent opinions of the United States Supreme Court 
to pull back from, or at least suspend for the time being, the enforcement of the 
... application of the federal Bill of Rights and the restraints of the due process 
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 
Brennan, supra note 13, at 495. See also Hancock, State Court Activism and Searches Incident 
to Arrest, 68 VA. L. REv. 1085, 1086 (1982) (discussing the movement of the state courts in 
response to the "Court's continual amendment of the Warren Court precedents over the past 
decade . . . "). 
44. Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. 
L. REv. 1324, 1494 (1982) [hereinafter Developments]. 
45. See generally Abrahamson, supra note 7; Linde, supra note 13; Developments, supra 
note 44. 
46. See, e.g., State v. Butterworth, 48 Wash. App. 152, 737 P.2d 1297 (1987) (under the 
state constitution defendant's privacy rights were violated when the police officers obtained 
defendant's unpublished telephone listing without a warrant); People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815 
(Colo. 1985) (police could not use homing transmitters under the Colorado constitution because 
"the Colorado proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures protects a greater range of 
privacy interest than does its federal counterpart.") 
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questions, 47 to difficult problems surrounding statements obtained from 
suspects,48 to questions exploring the reach of the counsel requirement 
under state and federal constitutions. 49 
I offer here, however, three very different cases from three very 
different parts of the country. The substantive legal issues all arise 
under the search and seizure provisions in the state and federal consti-
tutions, and each of the cases emphasizes the state review of the 
problem. 
1. The Massachusetts Decision 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was faced with a challenge 
concerning warrantless surveillance when a "one-party consent" had 
been obtained in Commonwealth v. Blood.50 A one-party consent 
typically involves an informer who is "wired" for sound and then 
engages in a conversation with the defendant. The conversation contains 
incriminating remarks and is ultimately used against the defendant. The 
United State Supreme Court has consistently held that such activity is 
beyond the protective reach of the fourth amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 51 In essence, the Court has decided that the taping 
of such conversations does "not invade the defendant's constitutionally 
justifiable expectations of privacy."52 The Massachusetts court acknowl-
47. See State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 443, 688 P.2d 136, 143 (1984) (declining to 
follow, under the state constitution, the United States Supreme Court's Gates decision for a 
"totality of circumstances" review of an affidavit's validity); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 
A.2d 66 (1975) (requiring police officers to warn suspects of their right to refuse warrantless 
searches, contradicting the United States Supreme Court's decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 u.s. 218 (1973)). 
48. A classic-and early-opinion is People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 
Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976), where the court rejected the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), which had allowed a defendant to be impeached with 
a statement which was otherwise inadmissible under Miranda. See also Hillard v. State, 406 A.2d 
415 (Md. Ct. App. 1979) (considering the inadmissibility of an incriminating declaration under 
Maryland law, independent of the federal Constitution). 
49. Probably the most significant early case is Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977), 
where the court refused to follow United States Supreme Court restrictions on the application of 
right to counsel provisions in the line-up setting. In particular, the court rejected the Supreme 
Court's decision in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), where it had been held that the sixth 
amendment did not attach until the defendant had been formally charged with a criminal offense; 
thus the defendant was not entitled to counsel at a pre-indictment line up. The Blue court 
determined that a criminal defendant was entitled to counsel in connection with a pretrial 
identification proceeding as soon as he had been arrested. 
50. 400 Mass. 61, 507 N.E.2d 1029 (1987). 
51. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 
(1971). 
52. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971). 
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edged contrary United States Supreme Court precedent, but looked 
instead to the protections offered under article 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, which is worded in a similar fashion. 53 The 
question was whether, under Massachusetts law, "society at large would 
think it reasonable for the defendants to expect that, in normal course, 
conversations held in private homes will not be broadcast and recorded 
surreptitiously. " 54 Strongly adopting the reasoning of the dissenters in 
United States v. White,55 the Massachusetts court concluded that state 
law gave considerably more protection than did federal law. The Blood 
court further stated: 
[I]t is not just the right to a silent, solitary autonomy which is 
threatened by electronic surveillance: It is the right to bring thoughts 
and emotions forth from the self in company with others doing 
likewise, the right to be known to others and to know them, and 
thus to be whole as a free member of a free society.56 
53. The Massachusetts search and seizure provision states: 
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, 
of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, 
are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously 
supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, 
to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or 
to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the person 
or objects of search, arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in 
cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the laws. 
MAss. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV. 
54. 400 Mass. at 68·69, 507 N.E.2d at 1033. 
55. See 401 U.S. at 768 (especially Justice Harlan's opinion). 
56. 400 Mass. at 69, 507 N.E.2d at 1034. The dissenting judges in Blood vigorously disagreed 
with the court, but not on the question of whether state law ought to be applied differently from 
federal law. Instead, the question the dissenters raised was whether Article 14 applied to the 
situation. 
This statute represents a modem response to a modem problem. The Framers of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights did not foresee the development of electronic 
surveillance just as they could not imagine the formation of highly organized and 
disciplined criminal groups. They did, however, intend that art. 14 and the other 
provisions provide the framework in which the republican ideals of liberty and order 
could flourish. But the court demands a liberal interpretation of art. 14 so that 
modern privacy rights are protected, while it insists upon a narrow reading when 
the needs of modern law enforcement are considered. In the guise of protecting 
privacy, it only protects those who are its greatest threat. 
Id. at 81, 507 N.E.2d at 1040 (Nolan, J., dissenting). 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, en bane, strongly agreed with the result in Blood. In 
Commonwealth v. Schaeffer, __ Pa. Super. __ , 535 A.2d 354 (1987) the court found a 
warrant was required under article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because "no citizen 
should have to expect that the government may immediately and irrevocably seize his private 
thoughts every time he voices them to another person." Id. at __ , 535 A.2d at 360. 
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2. The Colorado Decision 
In People v. Sporleder, 57 the trial court had suppressed evidence 
obtained by the use of a pen register. 58 The exact issue had previously 
come before the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland, 
where the Court found that there was no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in connection with these telephone numbers and hence no search 
had occurred under the fourth amendment.59 The Colorado court on 
appeal began its opinion by recognizing that article 2, section 7 of the 
Colorado Constitution was "substantially similar to its federal coun-
terpart. " 60 Still, the court had on numerous occasions made clear that 
it was not required to follow the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the fourth amendment when determining the scope of 
the state constitutional protection. 61 The court considered whether, 
under the state constitution, the defendant could have a reasonable 
expectation that the number that she dialed on her phone would remain 
free from government intrusion, absent a showing of probable cause 
and a warrant. 62 Although other states had taken a different view under 
their own state constitutions, 63 the Colorado court concluded that a 
citizen could properly have an expectation of privacy in the phone 
numbers and such an expectation would be reasonable. The court cited 
with approval the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State v. 
57. 666 P .2d 135 (Colo. 1983). 
58. A pen register is a device that can record numbers that are dialed on a telephone by 
monitoring electrical impulses that result from the dial on the phone being released. The register 
does not, however, record or monitor the actual phone conversation. 666 P.2d at 137. 
59. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). The Court specifically held that the use of a pen register did not 
constitute a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. at 741-43. 
60. 666 P.2d at 140. This surely was an understatement. Article 2, Section 7 of the Colorado 
constitution provides: 
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from 
unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place or seize any 
person or things shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the person 
or thing to be seized, as near as may be, nor without probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation reduced to writing. 
CoLO. CONST. art II, § 7. 
61. 666 P.2d at 140. In Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117 (Colo. 1980), the court 
rejected United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and held that a bank depositor did have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in deposits slips and checks which were voluntarily given to the 
banks and exposed to bank employees during the normal course of business. Id. at 1120-21. 
62. 666 P.2d at 141. 
63. See, e.g., Indiana Bell Tel. v. State, 409 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. 1980); Rastetter v. Behan, 
639 P.2d 510 (Mont. 1982); People v. Guerra, 116 Misc. 2d 272, 455 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1982). The 
Colorado court found the reasoning in these cases to be "unpersuasive for the very same reason 
we find unconvincing the United States Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Maryland." 666 
P.2d at 142-43 n.6. 
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HuntM where it was held that the individual had a constitutionally 
protected privacy interest in the phone company's billing records for 
his telephone: 
It is unrealistic to say that the cloak of privacy has been shed 
because the telephone company and some of its employees are aware 
of this information. Telephone calls cannot be made except through 
the telephone company's property and without payment to it for 
the service. This disclosure has been necessitated because of the 
nature of the instrumentality, but more significantly the disclosure 
has been for a limited business purpose and not for release to other 
persons for other reasons. The toll billing record is part of the 
privacy package. 6s 
3. The New Jersey Decision 
A recent, and highly controversial, state court decision explicitly 
rejecting a major United States Supreme Court opinion in the search 
and seizure area is State v. Novembrino.66 In Novembrino, the court 
reviewed whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in United 
States v. Leon61 would be accepted under the New Jersey state consti-
tution. The Supreme Court in Leon had rendered one of the major 
fourth amendment decisions of recent years when it held that evidence 
obtained as a result of a search would not be excluded if the police 
officer had, in good faith, reasonably relied on a warrant which turned 
out to be defective.68 The New Jersey court considered the issue under 
its own constitutional provision, recognizing that it should not "un-
critically adopt federal constitutional interpretations for the New Jersey 
constitution merely for the sake of consistency. " 69 The court also echoed 
numerous statements of other courts that the state constitutional pro-
visions may be a source of "individual liberties more expansive than 
those conferred by the federal constitution. " 70 Although the language 
of the New Jersey constitution on point was "virtually identical" to 
that of the federal fourth amendment, the court refused to adopt the 
64. 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982). 
65. Id. at 347, 450 A.2d at 956, quoted in People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 142. 
66. 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987). 
67. 468 u.s. 897 (1984). 
68. Id. at 922. 
69. 105 N.J. 98, 519 A.2d at 823 (citing State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 355, 450 A.2d 952, 969 
(1982) (Pashman, J ., concurring)). 
70. Id. at 124, 519 A.2d at 849 (citing Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 
81 (1980)). 
164 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
decision in Leon. Instead, the court held that the Leon rule "would 
tend to undermine the constitutionally-guaranteed standard of prob-
able cause, and in the process disrupt the highly effective procedures 
employed by our criminal justice system to accommodate that constitu-
tional guarantee without impairing law enforcement .... " 71 The court 
concluded by noting the disruption brought by Leon ''may reach such 
a level as to cause the [United States Supreme] Court to reconsider its 
experiment with the fourth amendment. " 72 
B. The State Cases 
The Massachusetts, Colorado, and New Jersey cases are striking in 
the clarity of their reliance on state constitutional language even when 
the wording of the state provisions is "almost identical to that found 
in the [federal constitution]. " 73 The movement toward reliance on state 
constitutions is, however, very recent, 74 in response to the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts' limitations of the criminal procedure decisions of 
the Warren Court. 75 Still, the movement is unmistakable, and almost 
unstoppable. 76 Some state judges have disagreed with the movement 
and strongly criticized different courses of action when the language of 
the state and federal constitutions is similar and where there appears 
to be no specific historical basis for different results.77 Moreover, 
71. Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 132, 519 A.2d at 857. 
72. Id. 
73. State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 674 (S.D. 1976). Even with virtually identical 
language and with the mandate of the United States Supreme Court absolutely clear (the court, 
after all, was given the case a second time for proceedings not inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court's decision earlier) the South Dakota court held that it was the "final authority on 
interpretation and enforcement of the South Dakota constitution." It then rejected the United 
States Supreme Court's earlier decision finding that inventory searches did not violate the fourth 
amendment. Id. 
74. Simon, Independent but Inadequate: State Constitutions and Protection of Freedom of 
Expression, 33 KAN. L. REv. 305, 306 (1985). 
75. Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1153. 
76. The number of state court decisions in recent years applying state constitutional principles 
has dramatically risen. Collins, et al, State High Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights 
Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey, 13 HAsTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 599 (1986). For an interesting 
ten year perspective, see Brennan, supra note 13, and Brennan, supra note 41. 
77. In People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976), the 
majority of the California Supreme Court rejected the Supreme Court's holding in Harris v. New 
York, 401 U.S. 221 (1971) (Miranda does not apply to impeachment use of earlier statements). 
The dissenting justices vigorously attacked the court's application of the state constitution which 
had language virtually identical to that found in the United States Constitution. 
The very obvious and substantial identity of phrasing in the two Constitutions 
strongly suggests to me the wisdom, insofar as possible, of identity of interpretation 
of those clauses .... [N]o special, unique, or distinctive California conditions exist 
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heeding the advice of some judges/8 a few states have amended their 
constitutions to provide either that the state language cannot be con-
strued to provide more protection for the citizens of that state than 
the U.S. Constitution would provide, or that rather severe restrictions 
will be placed on the exclusion of evidence which contravenes such 
provisions.79 In still other states, proposals are pending to limit the 
state constitution. 80 Nevertheless, the trend toward expanding the use 
of state constitutional provisions for protection of defendants appears 
almost certain now. 81 
IV. APPLYING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The debate over the application of state constitutional provlSlons 
does not simply rest with the question of whether such provisions ought 
to be applied in the face of federal law. Instead, there are are also the 
questions of how one applies such provisions, when those provisions 
are to be applied, and the kinds of limitations that should be imposed. 
which justify a departure from a general principle favoring uniformity. In my view, 
in the absence of very strong counter-veiling circumstances, we should defer to the 
leadership of the nation's highest court in its interpretation of nearly identical 
constitutional language, rather than attempt to create a separate echelon of state 
constitutional interpretations to which we will avert whenever a majority of this 
court differ from a particular high court interpretation. The reason for the foregoing 
principle is that it promotes uniformity and harmony in the area of the law which 
peculiarly and uniquely requires them. The alternative required by the majority must 
inevitably lead to growth of a shadow tier of dual constitutional interpretations state 
by state which, with temporal variances, will add complexity to an already compli-
cated body of law. 
16 Cal. 3d at 118-19, 545 P.2d at 283-84, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 371-72 (Richardson, J., dissenting}. 
78. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in F1orida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983}, criticized 
the state court's interpretation of state laws requiring greater protection for individual defendants 
than the federal constitution as not being "rational law enforcement." He went on to point out 
that the citizens of that state could amend the state constitution to reverse state court opinions 
which extended individual rights. For a denunciation of the former Chief Justice's position, see 
the statement made by a dissenting justice in State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255, 264 (Mont. 1983}: 
"the arrogance of a concurring opinion in Florida v. Casal . ... The Chief Justice of the United 
States did not agree with the decision of the Florida Supreme Court and suggested the United 
States Supreme Court was the sole repository of judicial wisdom and rationality." For further 
discussion of this criticism, see infra text accompanying notes 81-111. 
79. See infra text accompanying notes 154-56. 
80. There is much discussion in Arizona at this point in time. Without question, this discussion 
comes up not as a matter of general constitutional interpretation, but as a result of criticism of 
a few Arizona Supreme Court cases which appear to give criminal defendants greater rights under 
the state constitution than would be given under the federal constitution. See infra text accom-
panying notes 112-151. 
81. See Note, Individual Rights and State Constitutional Interpretations: Putting First Things 
First, 37 BAYLOR L. REv. 496, 497-98 (1985}. See generally Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614, 
625 P.2d 123, 126 (1981}. 
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At this point, state courts have taken four basic approaches to deal 
with claims that arise in criminal cases under both federal and state 
constitutional provisions. The first, and most restrictive, is simply a 
declaration by a state court that it will not apply a state constitutional 
provision in a manner different from a similar and parallel federal 
rule. 82 While not followed widely, it has become the model of various 
attempts to amend state constitutions so as to restrict independent 
interpretation. 83 
Another restricted view of the role of the state constitution is taken 
in a few states which actually consider state and federal claims in 
separate portions of a single opinion. 84 As noted by Justice Linde, the 
approach makes the discussion of the federal claim pure dicta when 
the state claim succeeds "[and] implies that the result could not be 
changed by amending the state constitution. " 85 
A much broader scope of review was made most famous in a series 
of cases decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Here the court 
looked initially to the federal rules. If the federal doctrine does not 
provide sufficient protection, then-but only then-the state court will 
look to the parallel state constitutional provision.86 The difficulty with 
this approach87 is that reliance on federal law may prevent an orderly 
and-again in Justice Linde's words-coherent development of the 
state's independent review of its own constitutionallaw.88 
The broadest view is that the state court should look to its own law 
''before deciding whether the state falls short of a national standard, 
so that no federal issue is properly reached when the state's law protects 
the claimed right. " 89 This way, the court can look to the precise 
language of the state court rules, the tradition and history within its 
own boundaries, and the policies shared by citizens of that state.90 
82. This is the position strongly taken by Chief Justice Lucas of the California Supreme 
Court. See infra note 99. 
83. Note, supra note 81, at 507. Of course, the most striking example is the Florida experience. 
The Florida constitution was amended in 1982 to require that the state constitutional exclusionary 
rule be interpreted in no broader fashion than is found in the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation. FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 12. See generally Florida v. Hume, 512 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 
1987). 
84. See, e.g., State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 450 A.2d 336 (1982). 
85. Linde, supra note 13, at 178. 
86. /d. 
87. Often called the "supplemental" or "interstial" approach. See generally Linde, supra 
note 13, at 175-79. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1153. 
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The strongest proponents of independent state review of state con-
stitutional provisions have vigorously argued in support of the approach 
requiring primary state constitutional review.91 In their eyes, the result 
is correct either because ''there has been an unmistakable trend in the 
[United States Supreme] Court to read the guarantees of individual 
liberty restrictively"92 or because it allows for a truly independent 
development of state law.93 Such a broad approach, however, has come 
under increasing criticism in recent years. Some contend that having 
individual states requiring different standards for law enforcement 
results in a constitutional system which does not promote "rational law 
enforcement. " 94 Others assert that it will encourage individual states to 
resort to the amendment process to bring state constitutional doctrine 
into line with the prevailing federal view.95 Powerful arguments have 
been advanced that state constitutional provisions should generally track 
the federal provisions when the language in both is sufficiently close, 
or there is an absence of clear historical reasons to require different 
treatment. On the former argument, then-Chief Justice Erickson's opinion 
in Colorado v. SporledeTJ6 is probably the leading statement. 
The United States Supreme Court may err in its interpretation of 
the Constitution and should not be followed blindly by courts which 
disagree with the high Court's analysis. Lower courts, however, 
should explain their divergences from the interpretation of higher 
appellate courts in reaching different conclusions. Courts which fail 
to explain important divergences from precedent run the risk of 
being accused of making policy decisions based on subjective result-
oriented reasons. . . . I do believe, however, that courts should be 
hesitant in interpreting identical language in state constitutions 
differently in their efforts to reach conclusions which differ from 
the United States Supreme Court .... [I] would be less quick than 
the majority in applying the Colorado Constitution to situations 
where there is no significant textual difference from its federal 
counterpart. 97 
91. Justices Shirley Abrahamson and Hans Linde have been the most visible-and vocal-
advocates. 
92. Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as 
Guardians, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 547 (1986). 
93. For a good discussion of the numerous cases which emphasize this point, see Abrahamson, 
supra note 7, at 1172. See also Goldberg, Stanley Mosk: A Federalist for the 1980's, 12 HAsTINGS 
CoNST. L.Q. 395, 401-02 (1985); Hancock, State Court Activism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 
68 VA. L. REv. 1085, 1086 (1982). 
94. Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
95. Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1154. 
96. 666 P .2d 135 (Colo. 1983). 
97. Id. at 149-50 (citations omitted) (Erickson, C.J., dissenting). See also Chief Justice 
168 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
The argument concerning historical bases was made forcefully by 
Justice Garibaldi, dissenting from the New Jersey Supreme Court's 
rejection of the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
doctrine in New Jersey v. Novembrino. 98 There he searched in vain for 
such historical or policy reasons which would distinguish New Jersey 
from the national experience. He argued that state law should follow 
federal rules unless one could point to prevailing historical or policy 
reasons.99 
The criticism over expanding state development of state constitutional 
provisions may be vigorous, but it has not prevailed generally. Over 
the last decade, the trend has been toward greater reliance on state 
constitutional provisions at the expense of uniformity in law enforce-
ment and general deference to United States Supreme Court interpre-
tations of the federal Constitution. Many judges, lawyers and 
commentators strongly support such a movement, contending that for 
both historical and policy reasons, the state judiciary should not be 
restricted in its independent interpretation of state constitutional doc-
trine: 
Just as state courts need not pursue the chimera of completely 
autonomous state constitutional doctrines, neither need they confine 
their disagreements with federal constitutional law to those cases in 
which state constitutional decisions can be grounded in textual or 
Erickson's dissent in Colorado v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 823 (Colo. 1985) (Erickson, C.J., dissenting) 
(urging the majority not to depart from United States Supreme Court doctrine "without principled 
reasons for doing so"). 
98. 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987). 
99. Consistent state and federal rulings are crucial to the rational development of 
criminal law and the guidance of our law-enforcement officials. Only a strong state 
purpose would justify divergence in this very sensitive area. An examination of the 
New Jersey Constitution, statutes, and cases reveals no such purpose, and in fact 
leads to the conclusion that adoption of the Leon and Sheppard limited good faith 
exception is consistent with New Jersey law. 
!d. at 141, 519 A.2d at 866 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See also Houston, 
42 Cal. 3d 595, 624, 724 P.2d 1166, 1185, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141, 160 (1986) (Lucas, J., dissenting), 
focusing on the law enforcement needs in this area: 
!d. 
As a general rule, I take exception to basing holdings such as this on independent 
state constitutional grounds where the language of the applicable provisions is almost 
identical to the federal Constitution, and without some greater showing of an 
independent state interest needing additional protection. Any argument for such 
holdings is further weakened in this case by the majority's failure to realize that the 
guarantees of the [f]ifth and [s]ixth [a]mendments, which it invokes in its extension 
of rights here, protect the rights of individuals accused or suspected of crimes. They 
do not exist in the abstract to proscribe any police conduct of which the majority 
disapproves. 
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historical differences. The fact that state and federal texts are 
parallel or even identical does not mean that the state constitution's 
framers intended to incorporate federal constitutional law into their 
own constitutions. . . . "Different men may employ identical lan-
guage yet intend vastly different meanings and consequences." 
Moreover, even if state and federal constitutional clauses are con-
ceded to have identical meanings, state courts are not barred from 
independently determining what those meanings are. The United 
States Supreme Court simply has no monopoly over determining 
what constitutes an "unreasonable search" or an infringement on 
"freedom of speech." '00 
Moreover, it is not at all clear that the lack of law enforcement 
uniformity is creating a problem. Over the last twenty years there have 
been considerable differences in the way state courts apply various rules 
of criminal procedure, yet no hard evidence has been offered to show 
that the result has seriously and adversely affected law enforcement on 
a national level. 101 
Some state judges have resisted vigorously applying state constitu-
tional law. Grassroots movements have developed in a few of the sun 
belt states.102 Still, more and more state judges are looking to their own 
state constitutional provisions prior to reviewing parallel federal stan-
dards.103 The California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Houston104 
illustrates this broader approach to the application of state constitutional 
law. The court there rejected the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Moran v. Burbine. 105 In Burbine, the Court held that "the police 
100. Developments, supra note 44, at 1497 (footnote omitted) (quoting Falk, The Supreme 
Court of California, 1971-1972: Forward-The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" 
Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 273, 282 (1973)). 
101. See Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and the Alaska Supreme Court: Criminal 
Procedure Rights and the New Federalism, 1960-1981, 18 GoNz. L. REv. 221, 259 (1983): 
I d. 
Some concern has been expressed about the Jack of uniformity in the Jaw that would 
result in the widespread use of state constitutional rights. It is unclear, however, 
what serious problems this would create above and beyond the fact of diversity of 
interpretations. Moreover, it is uncertain that any of the problems that might result 
would outweigh the benefits of a revitalized state judiciary. As Professor Howard 
has written in his lengthy review of State Supreme Court activities: "Both consti-
tutional history and theory support the case for an independent body of constitutional 
Jaw." 
102. Florida and California have already enacted constitutional amendments which restrict the 
ability of their state courts to take independent roles. See Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1154. 
In a number of states, including Arizona, such proposals have recently been made and debated. 
103. Brennan, supra note 41, at 551. 
104. 42 Cal. 3d 595, 724 P.2d 1166, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1986). 
105. 475 u.s. 412 (1986). 
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may conceal from a suspect the critical fact that his attorney is trying 
to reach him if the attorney is not physically present at the station.'' 106 
In Houston, the majority of the court began its decision by recognizing 
that it was to be the court of last resort in explaining the meaning of 
the state constitutional provisions, California's "Declaration of 
Rights." 107 Recognizing that the Constitution of the United States 
allowed states to give their citizens greater individual rights than given 
by the federal constitution, the court noted that "state charters offer 
important local protection against the ebbs and flows of federal con-
stitutional interpretation." 108 The court conceded that clear United 
States Supreme Court rulings were entitled to "respectful considera-
tion": 
But they are to be followed in California "only where they provide 
no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law." 
In appropriate cases we have forthrightly rejected adherence to 
United States Supreme Court precedent, even where it was necessary 
to overrule our own prior decision adopting the federal rule. 109 
Moreover, the court declared that its state constitution was not designed 
simply to track federal constitutional provisions or to rely on such 
provisions. Hence, an independent review of the state constitution was 
mandated: 
The debates at the Constitutional Convention of 1849 made quite 
clear that the language of the Declaration of Rights which comprises 
Article I of the California Constitution was not based upon the 
federal charter at all, but upon the constitutions of other states. 
When the 1849 Constitution was adopted, of course, the 14th 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, by which certain federal 
constitutional rights have been applied to the states, did not yet 
exist. Indeed, a reading of both the 1849 and 1878 constitutional 
debates reflects a common understanding that it was the state 
constitution, and not the federal, which would protect the rights of 
California citizens against arbitrary action by the state. 110 
The court in Houston recognized the contrary federal holding dealing 
with defendant rights. By looking principally to state constitutional 
provisions, the court adopted a different and more expansive rule for 
106. 42 Cal. 3d at 614, 724 P.2d at 1177-78, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 152 (Bird, C.J., concurring 
and dissenting). 
107. ld. at 609, 724 P.2d at 1174, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 148. 
108. ld. 
109. Id. at 609, 724 P.2d at 1174, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (citations omitted). 
110. Id. at 609 n.l3, 724 P.2d at 1174 n.13, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 149 n.l3 (citation omitted) 
(emphasis in original). 
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California actions, a rule reflecting the unique values and history of a 
sovereign state. 111 
V. THE ARizONA EXPERIENCE 
The application of purely state constitutional law to criminal cases 
has been sparse in Arizona. Those few cases which have been resolved 
by the state supreme court on state constitutional grounds have not 
been of particular significance. Arizona cases contrast with those in 
other states which have rejected the good faith exclusionary rule 
exemption of the Leon case, 112 the broad Gates affidavit validity test, 113 
the narrow view of the rights of criminal defendants with respect to 
their attorneys, 114 and the United States Supreme Court's inventory 
search ruling. 115 Instead, the Arizona experience has been relatively 
moderate, narrow in application, and fairly limited in impact, for the 
Arizona courts have simply not dealt with these broader questions. 116 
This limited application is somewhat surprising, as Arizona is a state 
where the equivalent fourth amendment language is considerably dif-
ferent from that found in the United States Constitution. Article 2, 
§ 8 of the Arizona Constitution provides: "No person shall be disturbed 
in his private affairs, or his home invaded without authority of law."117 
This language is more specific than that found in the fourth amendment 
and-at least arguably-requires more governmental deference. In 
Arizona, specific constitutional reference is made to "private affairs," a 
phrase not present in the federal constitution.ll8 Still, few cases have 
focused on the state constitution's privacy protection. Three principal 
cases have been decided, all in the last decade, which rely explicitly on 
state constitutional grounds. 
111. The Florida Supreme Court recently followed the California lead in rejecting Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). See Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987). 
112. State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987). 
113. State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984). 
114. People v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595, 724 P.2d 1166, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1986). 
115. State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976). Numerous other cases could also be 
discussed. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnston, 515 Pa. 454, 530 A.2d 74 (1987) (dog's "sniff 
search" for drugs is search under state constitution); State v. Dixson, 87 Or. App. 1, 740 P.2d 
1224 (1987) (search of home, under state constitution, includes curtilage outside of house). 
116. Thus, it is especially ironic that a political movement has apparently begun in Arizona 
to restrict the use of the state constitution to a level not to exceed that found in the federal con-
stitution. See Carson, Petition Drive to Seek Constitutional Amendment for Victim's Rights, Ariz. 
Daily Star, Aug. 30, 1987, § B, at 5, col. 1. 
117. ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 8. 
118. Jd. 
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State v. Bolt119 involved an appeal from the denial of a suppression 
motion where the defense claimed that the police had "secured" the 
defendant's house prior to obtaining a search warrant. Apparently the 
practice of securing the premises was a common one in which police 
entered a residence without a warrant (and without any emergency or 
exigent circumstances), rounded up occupants, and simply waited for 
an officer to arrive with a warrant. No one was allowed in or out of 
the premises during this waiting period. The Arizona Supreme Court 
concluded that federal law on this point was not clear. 120 The Bolt 
court focused exclusively on whether such an entry violates article 2, 
§ 8 of the Arizona Constitution. The court spoke in somewhat expansive 
terms about the heightened level of protection offered by the Arizona 
Constitution: 
While we are cognizant of the need for uniformity in interpretation, 
we are also aware of our people's fundamental belief in the sanctity 
and privacy of the home and the consequent prohibition against 
warrantless entry. We believe that it was these considerations that 
caused the framers of our constitution to settle upon the specific 
wording in Article 2, § 8. While Arizona's constitutional provisions 
generally were intended to incorporate the federal protections, they 
are specific in preserving the sanctity of homes and in creating a 
right of privacy .121 
Because of the wording of the Arizona Constitution, as well as the 
history and development within the state, the court found that officers 
could not make a warrantless entry unless an emergency situation were 
present. Such entries were held to be "per se unlawful" under the state 
constitution. 122 With no showing that any exigent circumstances existed, 
the court held that the police procedure violated the Arizona Consti-
tution wholly "independent of federal authority." 123 On this point the 
court was unanimous. The disagreement resulted from the question of 
whether the court should follow the federal rule of exclusion (which 
would not suppress the evidence here because of an independent source 
exception) or whether a separate state exclusionary rule, under the 
119. 142 Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519 (1984). 
120. After discussing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), the Bolt court noted that 
no majority of justices in Segura dealt with the crucial question of whether a "warrantless entry 
and inspection short of search is permitted by the [f]ourth [a]mendment absent exigent circum-
stances." 142 Ariz. at 264, 689 P.2d at 523. 
121. 142 Ariz. at 264-65, 689 P .2d at 523-24 (citation omitted). 
122. /d. at 265, 689 P .2d at 524. 
123. /d. This came within the confines of the "independent state ground" principle set out in 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 18-19. 
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Arizona Constitution, should be enforced. 124 The court, having decided 
that Arizona law specifically prohibited the police conduct, seemed 
poised to make a broad and expansive ruling concerning the particular 
remedy available under the state constitution: 
While the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule 
approved by the Supreme Court ... is a matter of federal law, we 
are certainly free to adopt a state version of the exclusionary rule 
that differs from the federal, so long as we do not fall below the 
federal standards. We could, therefore, under the appropriate cir-
cumstances, refuse to recognize the independent source exception 
as a matter of state law, even though it was recognized as a matter 
of federal law .125 
The court moved slowly even though it conceded that "on occasion 
we may not agree with the parameters of the exclusionary rule as 
defined by the United States Supreme Court." 126 Instead, Justice Feld-
man, for the majority, argued that it was important "to keep the 
Arizona exclusionary rule uniform with the federal." 127 The result was 
a narrow holding, the majority stating: "the exclusionary rule to be 
applied as a matter of state law is no broader than the federal rule." 128 
The state supreme court took a somewhat more dramatic step toward 
the application of purely state constitutional law in State v. Ault.129 At 
trial the defendant was convicted of burglary and child molestation. A 
major piece of evidence consisted of shoeprints that were found in the 
mud outside the victim's home. 130 When the police officers went to the 
defendant's house to arrest him, the defendant specifically told them 
they were not invited in. 131 Nevertheless, the police went inside, saw a 
pair of muddy tennis shoes, and took them. 132 These shoes were later 
used against the defendant because they matched the shoeprints found 
at the victim's home. 133 No warrant had been obtained prior to the 
seizure of the shoes. 134 
124. Justices Cameron and Hays specially concurred, looking to a balancing test as opposed 
to the flxed exclusionary rule. 142 Ariz. at 270, 689 P.2d at 529. 
125. Id. at 268, 689 f.2d at 527. 
126. Id. at 269, 689 P.2d at 528. 
127. Id. 
128. Id • 
. 129. ISO Ariz. 459, 724 P.2d 545 (1986). 
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One of the chief government arguments in Ault was that the shoes 
had been properly admitted in evidence under the "inevitable discovery 
doctrine,'' because they would have been seized pursuant to a search 
warrant which was executed later in the day .135 As a result, the state 
contended the shoes were admissible. The supreme court disagreed, 
stating that even though the United States Constitution and the Arizona 
Constitution both proscribed unreasonable searches and seizures by the 
government, and were both designed to deal with the unlawful entry 
of homes, the "Arizona Constitution is even more explicit than its 
federal counterpart in safeguarding the fundamental liberty of Arizona 
citizens. As a matter of Arizona law, officers may not make a war-
rantless entry into a home in the absence of exigent circumstances or 
other necessity.'' 136 Although recognizing that the inevitable discovery 
doctrine was established in Arizona, 137 the court refused to apply it to 
a case in which an illegal search of the defendant's home directly 
produced evidence against him. 138 The court once again noted that its 
holding was based on a violation of article 2, § 8 of the Arizona 
Constitution, and did not need to be consistent with the position the 
United States Supreme Court might take: 
While our constitutional provisions were generally intended to in-
corporate federal protections, they are specific in preserving the 
sanctity of homes and in creating a right of privacy .... We strongly 
adhere to the policy that unlawful entry into homes and seizure of 
evidence cannot be tolerated. The exceptions to the warrant ·require-
ment are narrow and we choose not to expand them. No exigent 
circumstances existed to allow a warrantless entry into defendant's 
home.139 
In the third case, double jeopardy, not fourth amendment rights were 
at issue. In Pool v. Superior Court, 140 the defendant claimed that his 
135. Id. at 463, 724 P.2d at 549. The court relied on Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), 
where the Supreme Court allowed the discovery and condition of the body of a murdered child 
to be admitted in evidence "because its discovery was found to be inevitable in spite of the fact 
that the location of the body was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights." 
150 Ariz. at 465, 724 P.2d at 551. 
136. 150 Ariz. at 463, 724 P .2d at 549 (citation omitted). 
137. Id. at 465, 724 P.2d at 551 (citing State v. Castenada, 150 Ariz. 382, 724 P.2d 1 (1986)). 
138. Id. at 465, 724 P.2d at 551. 
139. Id. at 466, 724 P.2d at 552 (citation omitted). The dissent vigorously disagreed with the 
majority, arguing that there was "no explanation why the policy reasons in support of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine should magically disappear at the door of 'King Gary's castle.' " 
Id. at 468, 724 P.2d at 554 (Cameron, J. dissenting) 
140. 139 Ariz. 98, 677 P.2d 261 (1984). 
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double jeopardy rights had been violated. 141 A new indictment had been 
filed after the defendant's motion to dismiss had been granted at trial. 142 
The case was an unusual one with the trial judge granting the defense 
motion for a mistrial on the ground of improper conduct on the part 
of the prosecutor.'43 Still, the trial judge denied a double jeopardy 
motion, relying on United States Supreme Court precedent to the effect 
that no constitutional error occurs if the prosecutor had not intended 
to provoke a mistrial. 144 A unanimous state supreme court disagreed 
with the result, finding constitutional error. 145 This holding directly 
conflicted with the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Oregon v. 
Kennedy146 where the Court found no double jeopardy problem because 
of the trial judge's finding that there was no prosecutorial intent to 
provoke a mistrial. 147 
The Arizona court once again explained that under the state consti-
tution, article 2, § 10, the court would "ordinarily interpret [state law] 
in conformity to the interpretation given by the United States Supreme 
Court to the same clause in the federal constitution.'' 148 Once again, 
though, the court refused to find the United States Supreme Court's 
decisions binding even with language that was quite similar to the 
federal constitution: 
We acknowledge, with respect, that decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court have great weight in interpreting those provisions 
of the state constitution which correspond to the federal provisions. 
We acknowledge that uniformity is desirable. However, the concept 
of federalism assumes the power, and duty, of independence in 
interpreting our own organic law. With all deference, therefore, we 
cannot and should not follow federal precedent blindly .149 
With this policy rationale in mind, the court had little difficulty in 
adopting the dissenting opinion in Oregon v. Kennedy and holding that 
jeopardy attaches under Arizona's article 2, § 10 when a mistrial is 
141. Id. at 104, 677 P.2d at 267-68. 
142. I d. at 105, 677 P .2d at 269. 
143. The prosecutor was angered by the defense and engaged in cross-examination in which 
"portions [were] only arguably proper and still others (were] irrelevant and rather prejudicial .... 
[T]he cross-examination [then] moved from the irrelevant and prejudicial to the egregiously 
improper." /d. at 101, 677 P.2d at 264. 
144. Id. at 104, 677 P.2d at 267. 
145. Id. at 108, 677 P.2d at 271. 
146. 456 u.s. 667 (1982). 
147. Id. at 671. 
148. 139 Ariz. at 108, 677 P.2d at 271. 
149. Id. (citing Kennedy, 295 Or. at 268-72, 666 P.2d at 1322-24). 
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granted because of improper activities by the prosecutor. The Pool 
court further wrote that prejudice to the defendant is present if the 
government conduct "is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, 
mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole amounts 
to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and 
prejudicial. ... " 150 
There are few additional cases beyond Bolt, Ault, and Pool that are 
of much significance.151 It can fairly be said that in Arizona the cases 
that are sharply different from federal law and which rely exclusively 
on the state constitution in resolving criminal questions are of recent 
vintage, few in number, and relatively mild in application. Unlike the 
experience in several other states such as California, Florida, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Colorado, Arizona's 
constitutional provisions have not been given much notice, either by 
counsel arguing in criminal justice cases, or by the state courts. 
VI. THE W A VB OF THE FUTURE? 
We have seen a tremendous and dramatic change in recent years in 
the way in which many state supreme courts view their own state 
constitutional law provisions in criminal justice cases. Many state jus-
tices have taken the strong position espoused by Justice Mosk of the 
California Supreme Court: "The federal constitution merely sets the 
floor for individual rights. State and international charters are free to 
prescribe the ceiling."152 Judge Newman of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with this proposition: "The 
resurgence of the spirit of the Old Federalism affords new opportunities 
for the vitality of our state constitution. We have every right to expect 
it to have increased significance.'' 153 
150. !d. at 108-09, 677 P.2d at 271-72. 
151. There have been other important cases, but these are opinions which either do not differ 
substantially from federal Jaw or do not particularly emphasize the language of the Arizona 
Constitution. 
152. Mosk, Beyond the Constitution, 7 CAL. LAW. 100 (1987). 
153. Newman, The 'Old Federalism': Protection of Individual Rights by State Constitutions 
in an Era of Federal Courts Passivity, 15 CoNN. L. REv. 21, 28 (1982). See also Developments, 
supra note 44, at 1356: 
/d. 
The duty to protect individual rights, a duty that both our federal structure and 
their own constitutions impose on the states, requires that state courts not regard 
their constitutions as mere mirrors of federal protections. The distinctive characters 
of state constitutions and state judiciaries reinforce the demand that state constitu-
tional interpretation not merely follow the federal lead. 
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With such strong and widespread support for the state constitutional 
law movement, it would seem as if the state constitutional law express 
cannot be derailed. Still, one must have some pause before jumping 
fully on this train of optimism. Quite a number of courts have; up 
until this time, viewed their state constitutional provisions as essentially 
equivalent to the federal constitutional rules and have refused to sub-
stantively distinguish them. 154 Moreover, when a few courts have moved 
too quickly in enforcing state constitutional protections, the reaction in 
the world of politics has been swift and harsh. In a few states there 
have been movements to amend state constitutions to eliminate the 
added protections of the state constitution for criminal defendants. The 
two most prominent examples, of course, are Florida and California. 
In Florida, the constitution was amended by initiative petition so that 
the search and seizure clause "shall be construed in conformity with 
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by 
the United States Supreme Court."155 In California, the limitation is 
linked to the exclusionary rule. The California Constitution now states: 
''Except as provided by statute . . . relevant evidence shall not be 
excluded in any criminal proceeding. . . . "1s6 
Even with this pause, however, it seems clear that more attorneys 
will raise the issue157 and more courts will look to the state constitution 
for questions arising out of criminal prosecutions. There are, undoubt-
edly, historical bases for such a first inquiry regarding the state con-
stitution. As former Justice Goldberg has pointed out, Alexander 
Hamilton in the Federalist Papers remarked that the "one transcendent 
vantage belonging to the providence of the state governments [is] the 
ordinary administratioh of criminal and civil justice.'' 158 Moreover, if 
154. See generally Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1166-67. 
155. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (amended 1982). 
156. CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 28(d) (amended 1982). For detailed discussions of the enactment 
of section 28(d) and its impact, see In re Lance, 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 
631 (1985) (compare the majority and dissenting opinions). 
157. The statement made by Justice Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme Court is telling: "I 
hope that in the future lawyers claiming a violation of fundamental rights will always discuss the 
relevance of the state constitution. A lawyer who ignores the change in tide towards constitutions 
runs the same risk as a sailor who ignores a change in the tides of the sea." Pollock, State 
Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 715 (1983). 
158. Goldberg, Stanley Mask: A Federalist for the 1980's, 12 HAsTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 395, 396 
(1985), referring to the statements in the Federalist Papers, No. 17. See also Note, supra note 81, 
at 497: 
Historically, the states' commitment to individual rights came first, as state bills of 
rights predate the federal Constitution. By 1784, each of the original thirteen states 
had adopted a constitution, and each of these constitutions contained provisions 
guaranteeing individual liberties against government action. However, the constitu-
178 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
the Rehnquist Court continues in the direction of the Burger Court and 
views the criminal justice decisions of the Warren Court restrictively, 159 
many judges will be inclined to look to state constitutional provisions 
for a more expansive set of protections. 160 To be sure, from many 
quarters there is considerable encouragement given to the state courts 
to continue this revolution of the "Old (or "New") Federalism." The 
foremost proponent is, without question, Supreme Court Justice Wil-
liam Brennan, who has repeatedly encouraged just such activity: 
This pattern of state court decisions puts to rest the notion that 
state constitutional provisions were adopted to mirror the federal 
Bill of Rights. The lesson of history is otherwise; indeed, the drafters 
of the federal Bill of Rights drew upon corresponding provisions 
and the various state constitutions. Prior to the adoption of the 
federal Constitution, each of the rights eventually recognized in the 
federal Bill of Rights had previously been protected in one or more 
state constitutions. 161 
Ultimately, many courts throughout the country will be asking-first 
and foremost-about their own state laws, declarations of rights, and 
constitutions, apart from the words or impact of the federal constitu-
tion. This is as it should be. The state courts have primary responsibility 
for reviewing their own state laws, and matters of criminal justice arise 
typically under the state law. In short, I believe that Justice Linde of 
/d. 
tiona! guarantees were by no means uniform. During the months preceding inde-
pendence, the idea of uniform constitutions was debated, but was rejected. Instead, 
each state was left to write a constitution satisfactory to itself. 
159. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44. 
160. Professor Galie made the point well: 
The Warren Court's "Bill of Rights Revolution" can be fairly described as spectac-
ular. One might even hazard a guess that the startling evidence of public ignorance 
of the Bill of Rights discovered in the forties has been dispelled. The fact is that 
few individuals have heard of or know what protections their state bills of rights 
contain. An examination of the scholarly literature on the subject finds the same 
neglect. No doubt there is some justification for this neglect as most state legislatures 
and courts have been acting for years as if these rights did not exist. Moreover, 
given the Warren Court's preemption of the field with one precedent shattering 
decision after another in the civil liberties area, there seemed to be little state courts 
could do, and few were inclined to do anything more than snipe at the Supreme 
Court or evade, where possible, the full impact of the court's decisions. 
Galie, supra note 101, at 223. 
161. Brennan, supra note 13, at 501. See also the statements made by former Justice Goldberg: 
"In the era of the Burger Court, the responsibility of protecting individual liberties has fallen on 
state courts. Some enlightened state jurists-such as Justice Mosk-have met the challenge. Others, 
regretfully, have been slower to respond." Goldberg, supra note 142, at 401. 
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the Oregon Supreme Court was correct when he identified the "right 
question" to be asked by state judges in such cases: 
The right question is not whether a state's guarantee is the same as 
or broader than its federal counterpart as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court. The right question is what the state's guarantee means and 
how it applies to the case at hand. The answer may tum out the 
same as it would under federal law. The state's law may prove to 
be more protective than federal law. The state law also may be less 
protective. In that case the court must go on to decide the claim 
under the federal law, assuming it has been raised. Courts are 
resuming their responsibility for the constitutional law of their states. 
As I have said, the questions for lawyers as well as judges is not 
whether to do so, but how. 162 
162. Linde, supra note 13, at 179. 
